Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law
Supreme Court Briefs

Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law

2016

Reply to Brief in Opposition, Melhorn v. Baltimore Washington
Conf. of United Methodist Church
Leslie C. Griffin
University of Nevada, Las Vegas -- William S. Boyd School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/scotusbriefs
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Labor and Employment Law Commons, and the
Religion Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Reply to Brief in Opposition, Melhorn v. Baltimore Washington Conf. of United Methodist Church, 137 S.
Ct. 377 (2016) (No. 16–245).

This Supreme Court Brief is brought to you by the Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law, an institutional
repository administered by the Wiener-Rogers Law Library at the William S. Boyd School of Law. For more
information, please contact youngwoo.ban@unlv.edu.

-- Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED

OCT 10 2016

No. 16-245

, ,OFFICE, OF THE CLERK

~upreme ~ourt of the ~niteb ~tate~

EDWIN R. MELHORN,
Petitioner,

BALTIMORE-WASHINGTON CONFERENCE
OF THE UNITED METHODIST CHURCH, et al.,
Respondents.

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari
To The Court Of Special Appeals Of Maryland

REPLY TO BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

LESLIE C. GRIFFIN, ESQ.
Counsel of Record
4505 S. Maryland Pkwy., Box 451003
Las Vegas, NV 89154-1003
(702) 895-2071
leslie.griffin@unlv.edu

COCKLE LEGAL BRIEFS (800) 225-6964
WWW.COCKLELEGALBRIEFS.COM

BLANK PAGE

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................ii
ARGUMENT ........................................................1
I.

This Case Can Be Resolved According to
Wrongful Discharge Law ...........................

II. Respondents Support an Absolute Ministerial Exception that Is at Odds with this
Court’s First Amendment Jurisprudence .... 3
III. The Cert-Worthy Question Was Left Open
in Hosanna-Tabor and Needs Clarification
5
CONCLUSION .....................................................7

ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES

Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct.
2751 (2014) ................................................................
4
Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S.
5
327 (1987) ..................................................................
Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005) ......................4
DeBruin v. St. Patrick Congregation, 816 N.W.2d
6
878 (Wis. 2012) ..........................................................
Donaldson v. Read Magazine, Inc., 333 U.S. 178
6
(1948) .........................................................................
Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) .........................1, 6
Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703
4
(1985) .........................................................................
Galetti v. Reeve, 331 P.3d 997 (N.M. Ct. App.
1
2014) ..........................................................................
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) ...........6
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of
5
Fla., 480 U.S. 136 (1987) ...........................................
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church
and School v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012) .... passim
Illinois, ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Associ6
ates, Inc., 538 U.S. 600 (2003) ...................................
Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979) ............................1, 4

ooo

III

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued
Page
Kirby v. Lexington Theological Seminary, 426
S.W.3d 597 (Ky. 2014) ................................................ 1
Listecki v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors, 780 F.3d 731 (7th Cir.), cert. dismissed,
136 S. Ct. 581 (2015) .................................................6
McKelvey v. Pierce, 800 A.2d 840 (N.J. 2002) ...............1
Melhorn v. Baltimore Washington Conference of
United Methodist Church, No. 2065 Sept.
Term 2014, 2016 WL 1065884 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. Mar. 16, 2016) ...................................................3
Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U.S.
147 (1939) ..................................................................6
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) ..................... 4
Wholey v. Sears Roebuck, 803 A.2d 482 (Md.
2002) ..........................................................................2
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
U.S. Const., amend. I ..........................................passim

BLANK PAGE

1
ARGUMENT
I.

This Case Can Be Resolved According to
Wrongful Discharge Law.

This Court has long endorsed the idea that religious actors are required to obey neutral laws because
the rule of law protects everyone. See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf,
443 U.S. 595,604 (1979); Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).
Consistent with this Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence, state and federal courts have abstained from
hearing cases under the "ecclesiastical abstention rule"
only when the dispute cannot be resolved according to
neutral principles of law. See, e.g., Kirby v. Lexington
Theological Seminary, 426 S.W.3d 597, 618 (Ky. 2014)
("Secular courts may, however, have jurisdiction over a
case involving a church if’neutral principles of law’ can
be applied in reaching the resolution."). For this reason, the Supreme Court of Kentucky, in its ministerial
exception cases, allowed breach-of-contract lawsuits
against a Christian seminary to proceed because the
litigation could be resolved according to neutral, nonreligious principles of law, just like Petitioner’s case
here. Id. at 615; see also Galetti v. Reeve, 331 P.3d 997,
1001 (N.M. Ct. App. 2014) (when tort and contract
claims can be "’resolved by the application of purely
neutral principles of law and without impermissible
government intrusion.., there is no First Amendment
shield to litigation’") (quoting McKelvey v. Pierce, 800
A.2d 840, 852 (N.J. 2002)) (emphasis, internal quotation marks, and citations omitted).
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Respondents and the Maryland courts mischaracterized Petitioner’s case as a purely religious dispute
that the courts cannot adjudicate. This argument ignores the nature of the wrongful discharge tort. In
Maryland, "to establish wrongful discharge, the employee must be discharged, the basis for the employee’s
discharge must violate some clear mandate of public
policy, and there must be a nexus between the employee’s conduct and the employer’s decision to fire the
employee." Wholey v. Sears Roebuck, 803 A.2d 482,489
(Md. 2002). The Maryland courts’ dismissal of Petitioner’s case deprived him of the opportunity to establish that his employer fired him for refusing to ask
Wells Fargo Bank to fraudulently disburse trust funds
for a cemetery that the church no longer owned.
The trial court, not this Court, is the appropriate
place for Respondents to contest the facts of this case,
which ended on a motion to dismiss. Respondents’ factual response to the Petition confirms the wisdom of a
ruling from this Court allowing Petitioner and Respondents to participate in a lawsuit conducted according to the principles of Maryland tort law, which would
award him damages for his injury and not reinstatement as a minister.
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II. Respondents Support an Absolute Ministerial Exception that Is at Odds with this
Court’s First Amendment Jurisprudence.
It is Respondents, not Petitioner, who argue that
this case should be dismissed on the "face of the complaint" without any consideration of possible fraud, tax
evasion, or other illegal conduct. And they erroneously
won that argument below. Even though Petitioner’s
wrongful discharge case involved possibly fraudulent
activity that could be resolved under secular legal
principles, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals dismissed Petitioner’s wrongful discharge case as absolutely barred by the ministerial exception simply
because Melhorn is a minister. Melhorn v. Baltimore
Washington Conference of United Methodist Church,
No. 2065 Sept. Term 2014, 2016 WL 1065884, *5 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. Mar. 16, 2016). Dismissal on the face of
the complaint even though fraudulent activity has occurred is an absolute rule that will allow ministers to
be subjected to endless illegal activity. The lower courts
are split on its applicability in ministerial exception
circumstances. Nonetheless, even though they won under such an absolute rule, Respondents incorrectly assert that no court has ever recognized the ministerial
exception as an absolute defense to liability in all circumstances.
The face of the complaint rule that Respondents
require would absolutely immunize church employers
from liability, even though this Court has never extended such an absolute immunity to religious organizations in cases that involve illegal conduct or third
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party harm and that may be resolved through "neutral
principles of law." Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 604
(1979); see also Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church and School v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 710 (2012).
Respondents incorrectly argue that no third-party
interests are involved in this case because Pastor
Melhorn was the only individual to sue the Respondents. From Respondents’ perspective, third parties
have interests in the rule of law only when they are
litigants. That argument ignores the fact that the neutral application of the rule of law protects everyone’s
interests and is required by the First Amendment. See,
e.g., Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 709
(1985) (religious accommodations must take account of
third-party interests); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S.
252, 261 (1982) (same); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S.
709, 720, 722 (2005) (prisoners’ demands under
RLUIPA must be weighed against the "burdens a requested accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries" and "measured so that [they do] not override other
significant interests."); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (religious accommodations
must consider interests of third-party employees).
Tort law and tax law, like most neutral laws of general applicability, protect third parties’ interests even
when the third parties are not litigants. Indeed, this
Court has always weighed the proposed actions of First
Amendment rights holders against potential harm to
third parties because "[a]t some point, accommodation
[of religious freedom] may devolve into ’an unlawful
fostering of religion’" and violate the Establishment

Clause. Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 33435 (1987) (quoting Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals
Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 145 (1987)). Thus, it is
appropriate for this Court to consider third-party interests in Petitioner’s case.
III. The Cert-Worthy Question Was Left Open
in Hosanna-Tabor and Needs Clarification
Now o

Respondents argue that Petitioner’s case is not
cert-worthy because it involves wrongful discharge
and not breach of contract. Yet it is the conflicting
range of tort and contract cases across the country that
warrants this Court’s attention. Contract and tort
claims are frequently intertwined in employment dispute cases. Moreover, this Court suggested that ministerial exception tort and contract cases might be
governed by the same principle when it "express [ed] no
view on whether the [ministerial] exception bars other
types of suits, including actions by employees alleging
breach of contract or tortious conduct by their religious
employers. There will be time enough to address the
applicability of the exception to other circumstances if
and when they arise." Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at
710.
As the cases presented in the Petition demonstrate, various state and federal courts have used very
similar ministerial exception arguments in both tort
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and contract cases, dismissing some and hearing others. They now require this Court’s guidance to avoid
the possibility that a church’s ability to wrongfully discharge ministers is so "sacrosanct" that no court may
ever review it. DeBruin v. St. Patrick Congregation, 816
N.W.2d 878, 912 (Wis. 2012) (Bradley, J., dissenting). In
particular, this Court needs to clarify that the ministerial exception is not a license to defraud.
Petitioner requests this Court to clarify that the
First Amendment does not absolutely protect fraud,
misrepresentation, or illegal acts in the employment
setting. See, e.g., Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 ("reject[ing] the
claim that criminal laws against polygamy could not
be constitutionally applied to those whose religion
commanded the practice."); Donaldson v. Read Magazine, Inc., 333 U.S. 178, 190 (1948) (the government’s
power "to protect people against fraud" has "always
been recognized in this country and is firmly established"); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,
340 (1974) (the "intentional lie" is "no essential part of
any exposition of ideas" (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Illinois, ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates, Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 606 (2003) ("when nondisclosure is accompanied by intentionally misleading
statements designed to deceive the listener, the First
Amendment leaves room for a fraud claim."); Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U.S. 147, 164
(1939) ("Frauds," including "fraudulent appeals ...
made in the name of charity and religion," may be "denounced as offenses and punished by law."); Listecki v.
Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors, 780 F.3d 731,
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742 (7th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 136 S. Ct. 581 (2015) ("it
is unclear whether the intrachurch doctrine is even applicable where fraud is alleged").
In the midst of such disagreements, now is the
time for this Court to clarify that the ministerial exception does not ban breach of contract or tortious conduct lawsuits where illegal conduct or harm to third
parties is involved.

CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Petition for Certiorari
should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
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